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NOTES AND COMMENTS
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A program of rehabilitation based on psychiatric treatment could cure
the accused in many cases, and by doing this, more serious crimes in
the future would be prevented. It is society, not the defendant, which
will receive the chief benefits from this rule.
In a dissenting opinion in a case in the United States Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, there was a statement suggestive of
the North Carolina situation,
"The rule of M'Naghten's case was created by decision. Perhaps
it is not too much to think that it may be altered by the same
means.1

49

THOMAS G. NALL.

Criminal Law-Improper Court Response to Spontaneous Jury
Inquiry as to Pardon and Parole Possibilities
Does a jury which has "unbridled discretion" to recommend life
imprisonment in a capital case have a right to consider what effect
parole and pardon may have upon that sentence? North Carolina first
answered this question in State v. Dockery,' where a private prosecutor
referred to parole possibilities in his argument before the jury. In
reversing, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that such argument
was prejudicial and directly in conflict with the 1949 statutory proviso
which granted to juries the right to recommend life imprisonment in
capital cases.2 Recently, in State v. Conner,3 the problem arose in a
different manner. Here, the jury spontaneously returned to the court
room after having deliberated for some time, and one of the jurors asked
the court the following question: "Will the defendant be eligible for
parole if given life imprisonment?" The court replied without elaboration, "Gentlemen, I cannot answer that question." The supreme court
held that the presiding judge was correct in refraining from commenting
on defendant's eligibility for parole, because such matters are deemed
in law to be irrelevant to the issues involved in the case and prejudicial
to the accused. The court granted a new trial, however, on the ground
that once such a question was propounded, it became the duty of the
presiding judge to positively charge the jury to put the question and
matters relating thereto out of their minds.
The courts have long been divided as to the permissibility of an
explanation, in response to queries from the jury, of the possible effect of
"United States v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540, 568 (3rd Cir. 1951). The dissenting

judges were Biggs, McLaughlin, and Staley.
1 238 N. C. 222, 77 S.E. 2d 664 (1953).
2
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (1953). The 1949 proviso referred to above by the
court was added to this section by the 1949 Session Laws of North Carolina, Chapter 299, section 1.
241 N. C. 468, 85 S.E. 2d 584 (1955).
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pardon and parole upon a sentence. North Carolina's position is that
of perhaps a bare majority of jurisdictions, 4 with the exception that few
other courts hold the trial court responsible for instructing the jury to
dismiss the factor from their minds, 5 once the question has been propounded.
The basic reason for excluding such matters from the jury is that
the power of pardon and parole rests with the executive-not the judicial-branch of government, and the jury's discretion should not be
influenced by speculation as to what another branch of government may
'In addition to North Carolina, the following states hold that such explanation
is improper: Colorado: Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P. 2d 233 (1941).
Georgia: Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 369 (1954) ; Strickland v. State,
209 Ga. 65, 70 S. E. 2d 710 (1952) ; Thompson v. State, 203 Ga. 416, 47 S. E. 2d
54 (1948). In the Bland case three justices thought the trial judge's explanation
of pardon and parole in response to a jury inquiry was proper. Another concurred
on the ground that no objection thereto was timely entered, so the case was affirmed.
(The North Carolina court usually grants a new trial in capital cases where there
is error, regardless of whether an exception has been timely entered.) See Note,
31 N. C. L. RZxv. 300 (1953). Kentucky: Houston v. Commonwealth, 270 Ky. 125,
109 S. W. 2d 45 (1937) ; Gaines v. Commonwealth, 242 Ky. 237, 46 S. W. 2d 75

(1932). Missouri: State v. Quilling, 363 Mo. 1016, 256 S. W. 2d 751 (1953). But
see also State v. McGee, 361 Mo. 309, 234 S. W. 2d 587 (1950), and State v. Shipman, 354 Mo. 265, 189 S. W. 2d 273 (1945). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v.
Carey, 368 Pa. 157, 82 A. 2d 240 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139,
81 A. 2d 569 (1951) ; Commonwealth v. Mills, 350 Pa. 478, 39 A. 2d 572 (1944).
Tennessee: Williams v. State, 191 Tenn. 456, 234, S. W. 2d 993 (1950) ; Porter v.
State, 177 Tenn. 515, 151 S. W. 2d 171 (1941). Texas: Moore v. State, 152 Tex.
Cr. App. 312, 213 S. W. 2d 844 (1948) ; Prater v. State, 131 Tex. Cr. 35, 95 S. W.
2d 971 (1936). Virginia: Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S. E. 2d 693
(1952).
Explanations by the trial court have been sustained in the following states:
Arkansas: Glover v. State, 211 Ark. 1002, 204 S. W. 2d 373 (1947).

But in a

later case it was held error for the trial judge to answer from his personal observations rather than with declarations of law. Bell v. State, 265 S. W. 2d 709 (Ark.

1954). California: It is generally held that the jury should not consider the possibility of parole or pardon in determining guilt; however, the jury may consider
and the court instruct as to how pardon and parole relates to the punishment. See
People v. Barclay, 40 Cal. 2d 146, 252 P. 2d 321 (1953) ; People v. Chessman, 38
Cal. 2d 166, 238 P. 2d 1001 (1951) ; People v. Osborn, 37 Cal. 2d 380, 231 P. 2d 850
(1951) ; People v. Alcade, 24 Cal. 2d 177, 148 P. 2d 627 (1944). Earlier cases
clearly held that the proper course was for the trial judge to refuse to discuss
parole and pardon in response to queries from the jury. People v. Hoyt, 20 Cal. 2d
306, 125 P. 2d 29 (1942) ; People v. Ramos, 3 Cal. 2d 269, 44 P. 2d 301 (1935).
Kansas: State v. Lammers, 171 Kan. 668, 237 P. 2d 410 (1951). Nebraska: The
court, in the exercise of judicial discretion, may reply or refuse to reply to jury
inquiry as to parole eligibility of defendant. Griffith v. State, 157 Neb. 448, 59
N. W. 2d 701 (1953). New Jersey: State v. Molnar, 133 N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d
197 (1945) ; State v. Barth, 114 N. J. L. 112, 176 Atl. 183 (1935). Ohio: State v.
Tudor, 154 Ohio St. 249, 95 N. E. 2d 385 (1950) ; State v. Evans, 146 Ohio St. 276,
63 N. E. 2d 838 (1945) ; Liska v. State, 115 Ohio St. 283, 152 N. E. 667 (1926) ;
State v. Schiller, 70 Ohio St. 1, 70 N. E. 505 (1904). Wyoming: State v. Carrol,
52 Wyo. 29, 69 P. 2d 542 (1937). However, jury should be told not to speculate
on what might happen after verdict.
' See Jones v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 72 S. E. 2d 693 (1952). But note
that in Virginia it is the duty of the jury to impose such punishment as they consider to be just under the evidence; whereas, in North Carolina, the jury need not
consider the evidence in exercising its "unbridled discretion" to recommend life
imprisonment. State v. McMillan, 233 N. C. 630, 65 S. E. 2d 212 (1951).
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do in the future. Furthermore, punishment is assessed against a person
convicted of crime on the basis of his acts and conduct prior to trial;
whereas, parole is determined mainly on the basis of subsequent acts
and demeanor. 7 Other less frequently used arguments include the following: parole and pardon rules and regulations may change; hence, the
regulations influencing a jury's action might not be the ones the defendant will be subject to at a later time.8 If jurors impose capital punishment because of the fear that the defendant may be paroled at some
future time, they are, in effect, predicting that he will be paroled even
though unworthy of it.9 Moreover, even though an undeserving person
may be released, the weakness is one of the parole system and does not
necessarily mean that the defendant should be executed.' 0
In cases where the prosecuting counsel argues the possibility of
parole or pardon as in the Dockery case, the majority of jurisdictions do
not regard it as proper ;'1 however, many are reluctant to consider this
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. 12 In Kentucky, where the
propriety of such argument has been most frequently considered, the
0Sukle v. People, 107 Colo. 269, 111 P. 2d 233 (1941) ; Thompson v. State, 203
Ga. 416, 47 S. E. 2d 53 (1948) ; State v. Conner, 241 N. C. 468, 85 S. E. 2d 584

(1955) ; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa. 139, 81 A. 2d 569 (1951) ; Prater v.
State, 177 Tenn. 515, 151, S. W. 2d 171 (1941).
7State v. Conner, 241 N. C. 468, 469, 85 S. E. 2d 584, 586 (1955).

Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S. W. 2d 73 (Ky. 1954).

o Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 1009, 1118 (1953).
20 Ibid.

" Alabama: Cobb v. State, 248 Ala. 548, 28 So. 2d 713 (1947) ; Oliver v. State,
232 Ala. 5, 166 So. 615 (1936). California: People v. Byrd, 42 Cal. 2d 200, 266
P. 2d 505 (1954). Illinois: People v. Burgard, 377 Il. 322, 36 N. E. 2d 558 (1941) ;
People v. Klapperich, 370 Ill. 588, 19 N. E. 2d 579 (1939) ; People v. Kircher, 333
Ill. 200, 164 N. E. 150 (1928). Indiana: Pollard v. State, 201 Ind. 180, 166 N. E.
654 (1929). Kenttucky: Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S. W. 2d 73 (Ky. 1954) ;
Howard v. Commonwealth, 313 Ky. 667, 233 S. W. 2d 282 (1950) ; Bass v. Commonwealth, 296 Ky. 426, 177 S.W. 2d 282 (1944) ; Powell v. Commonwealth, 276
Ky. 234, 123 S. W. 2d 279 (1938); Lee v. Commonwealth, 262 Ky. 15, 89 S. W.
2d 316 (1935) ; Tiernay v. Commonwealth, 241 Ky. 201, 43 S. W. 2d 661 (1931) ;
Hall v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 718, 270 S. W. 5 (1925) ; Bolin v. Commonwealth,
206 Ky. 608, 268 S. W. 306 (1925) ; Chappel v. Commonwealth, 200 Ky. 429, 255
S. W. 90 (1923). Louisiana: State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940) ;
State v. Johnson, 151 La. 625, 92 So. 139 (1922). Mississippi: Augustine v. State,
201 Miss. 731, 28 So. 2d 243 (1946). Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Earnest,
342 Pa. 544, 21 A. 2d 38 (1941). Texas: Pena v. State, 137 Tex. Cr. 311, 129
S. W. 2d 667 (1939). Virginia: Dingus v. Commonwealth, 194 Va. 273, 149 S. E.
414 (1929).
The following states have held such arguments by prosecutors not to be improper: Arizona: State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1942) ; Sullivan v.
State, 47 Ariz. 224, 55 P. 2d 312 (1936). Arkansas: House v. State, 122 Ark. 476,
92 S. W. 2d 868 (1936). Georgia: Fields v. State, 88 Ga. App. 1, 75 S. E. 2d 839
(1953) ; McLendon v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 52 S. E. 2d 294 (1949) ; Bryan v. State,
206 Ga. 73, 55 S. E. 2d 574 (1949) ; Hyde v. State, 196 Ga. 475, 26 S. E. 2d 744
(1943) ; Lucas v. State, 146 Ga. 315, 91 S. E. 72 (1916). Washington: State v.
Buttry, 199 Wash. 228, 90 P. 2d 1026 (1939); State v. Talbott, 199 Wash. 431,
91 P. 2d 1020 (1939).
12 See Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 342 (1949).
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court formerly took such a position. 13 Recently, however, the Kentucky
court granted a new trial on the ground that such argument was prejudicial. 14 Apparently, the court was influenced by the fact that prosecutors persisted in talking about parole and pardon, though the court had
for thirty years consistently condemned such argument as improper.
Paradoxically, the Georgia court does not regard argument of parole
and pardon possibilities by the prosecutor as improper, although it has
held instruction by the trial court in response to jury questions about
such matter to be reversible error. 15 One distinction offered is that
when the prosecutor refers to the possibility of a pardon or parole, it
does not bind the jury but is merely a matter of argument; whereas,
when the court speaks, the jury receives it as solemn verity.'" However,
a review of the language used by some of the Georgia proscutors immediately raises the issue as to which is more prejudicial, a fair and accurate instruction on the part of the court, or a zealous and impassioned
argument by the prosecutor. 17
There is substantial authority holding that it is not improper for a
jury to consider parole and pardon possibilities.' 8 One line of reasoning
is that the fact that a person sentenced to life imprisonment may be
paroled is universal knowledge among intelligent citizens, and the jury
is entitled to consider the effect parole will have upon the sentence which
it imposes. 19 Also, it is maintained that society is entitled to have the
jury know the true meaning of their verdict, 20 namely, life imprisonment
provided the defendant is not paroled or pardoned.
Where, as in North Carolina, there are no conditions attached to, and
no qualifications or limitations imposed upon, the right of the jury to
recommend life imprisonment,21 there would seem to be several reasons
See Kentucky cases cited in note 11 supra, which were decided prior to 1954.
' Broyles v. Commonwealth, 267 S.W. 2d 73 (Ky. 1954).

13

4

10

Compare Georgia cases cited in note 11 supra, with those cited in note 4 supra.

Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S. E. 2d 369, 371 (1954). (concurring opinion).

7 "If you give the defendant a life sentence his lawyers and some politicians will

get him out of jail and have him walking the streets in a few years." McLendon
v. State, 205 Ga. 55, 63, 52 S.E. 2d 294, 299 (1949). In White v. State, 177 Ga.

115, 125, 169 S.E. 499, 504 (1933), the judge instructed the jury not to consider

the following language; however, no mistrial was declared and the case was affirmed
on appeal: "The jury has it in their power to recommend imprisonment for life.

Now what does that mean?

It means that after three years this defendent has a

right to ask for a parole by going over with a sob sister from the Interracial
Commission."
18

State v. Macias, 60 Ariz. 93, 131 P. 2d 810 (1942); Sullivan v. State, 47

Ariz. 224, 55 P. 2d 312 (1936) ; see also other cases in second paragraph, note 11
sup ra.
1" State v. Molnar, 133 N. J. L. 327, 44 A. 2d 197 (1945) ; State v. Shawen, 40
W. Va. 1, 8, 20 S.E. 873, 875 (1894). In the latter case it is said: "The jury was
the sole judge as to whether prisoner should die or suffer lifelong imprisonmentand cannot the jury consider whether the circumstances of the crime show its perpetrator to be a desperate man and an enemy of society, and dangerous, should he
escape or be pardoned ?"
2 Bland v. State, 211 Ga. 178, 84 S.E. 2d 369 (1954).
21 State v. McMillan, 233 N. C. 630, 65 S. E. 2d 212 (1951).
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for allowing the jury to consider the possibility of defendant's subse22
quent release in arriving at its decision.
In the first place, if the basic philosophy upon which a jury seeks to
arrive at its decision is one based upon the idea of punishment, it would
seem proper that they consider parole and pardon possibilities, because
such factors bear directly on the quantum of the punishment.
Secondly, if the sentence is imposed as a deterrent to future crimes,
should the jury not be allowed to consider whether a life sentence with
a possibility of parole will be a sufficient deterrent? Also, if the sentence is based upon the idea of protecting society through the rehabilitation of the defendant, the jury must necessarily decide whether the
defendant is beyond rehabilitation. If they decide he is, should they be
forbidden to consider the possibility that he may be released in the future
if given a life sentence?
At any rate, it is reasonable to assume that most intelligent jurors
are aware that there is a fair possibility that a convicted person will not
serve the full sentence imposed. It is equally reasonable to assume that
they often consider this possibility in deliberating on questions of punishment in capital cases. Even if the correctness of the North Carolina court
in holding such considerations to be prejudicial and improper be conceded, the present approach of the court affords theoretical protection
only in those cases where the issue of parol or pardon is openly raised
by the prosecutor or jury. In other cases, the jury is left free to apply
its own knowledge of the laws relating to parole and pardon, if it chooses
23
to do so.
As long as we are to follow the present North Carolina view as to
the total irrelevancy of parole and pardon, it is submitted that a better
approach would be to allow the trial court to inform the jury in its charge
that they are to consider no matters relating to pardon or parole in withholding a recommendation of life imprisonment. This would prevent the
problem of a later request by the jury for information as to the possibility of parole or pardon. But perhaps even more important, it would
discourage the jury from being influenced by any misconceived ideas
individual jurors might have as to defendant's parole and pardon eligibilty.
WILLIAM E. GRAHAM, JR.
2 "The court has said the jurors have the right in their unbridled discretion to
recommend life imprisonment. The right to refuse to make such a recommendation
is equally unbridled. For the judge to have told the jury that the question of
parole was no concern of theirs and that they should not consider it tends to put
a bridle on discretion." Higgins, J., dissenting in Conner v. State, 241 N. C. 468,

472, 473, 85 S. E. 2d 584, 588 (1955).

" In any event, it is doubtful whether the defendant's interests are served by
leaving the jury to apply its own limited knowledge of parole laws, and the fact
of this common knowledge cannot be overlooked." Note, 90 U. OF PA. L. Rrv.

221, 222 (1941).

